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There are a variety of qualitative and quantitative tools for measuring safety climate. 
However, questionnaires are by far the most commonly used methodology. This paper 
reports the descriptive analysis of a large sample of safety climate survey data (n=110,014) 
collected over ten years from U.S. Naval aircrew using the Command Safety Assessment 
Survey (CSAS). The analysis demonstrated that there was substantial non-random response 
bias associated with the data (the reverse worded items had a unique pattern of responses, 
there was a increasing tendency over time to only provide a modal response, the responses to 
the same item towards the beginning and end of the questionnaire did not correlate as highly 
as might be expected, and the faster the questionnaire was completed the higher the 
frequency of modal responses). It is suggested that the non-random responses bias was due to 
the negative effect on participant motivation of a number of factors (questionnaire design, 
lack of a belief in the importance of the response, participant fatigue, and questionnaire 
administration). Researchers must consider the factors that increase the likelihood of non-
random measurement error in safety climate survey data and cease to rely on data that are 
solely collected using a long and complex questionnaire. 
 





Safety climate describes employees' perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and 
safety (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Over 40 different safety climate measures have been developed 
(Yule, O’Connor, & Flin, 2003), and have been used in a wide range of high-risk industries 
(see Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000 for a discussion). Further, in much of the 
published research on safety climate, a questionnaire is the single method used to evaluate 
safety climate (e.g., Desai, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2006; Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 
2006; Singer et al., 2003).  
There has been an ongoing debate within the safety literature regarding the use of the 
terms ’culture‘ and ’climate,’ and whether they represent the same or different concepts. The 
general consensus is that culture represents the more stable and enduring characteristics of 
the organization, and has been likened to its dimensions or ’personality.’ Safety culture is a 
complex and enduring trait, reflecting fundamental values, norms, assumptions, and 
expectations, which, to some extent, reside in societal culture (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Safety 
climate, on the other hand, is thought to represent a more visible manifestation of the culture, 
which can be seen as its ’mood state,’ at a particular moment in time (Cox & Flin, 1998). It is 
generally accepted that the questionnaires provide a measure of the safety climate of the 
organization at the time of the study. 
Guldenmund (2007) describes the safety climate questionnaire as a quick but ‘dirty’ 
instrument to assess an organization’s state of safety. It is quick because a large amount of 
data can be collected with fairly minimal effort required by either the researchers, or the 
participants. It is ‘dirty’ because the survey only gives a broad perspective of the safety 
climate of an organization. Questionnaires are also appealing as they allow for statistical 
comparisons between different variables such as type of job or seniority. However, despite 
the prevalence and appeal of questionnaires, a number of researchers are beginning to 
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question the usefulness of the methodology for collecting valid information on safety climate 
(e.g., Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2007). 
Guldenmund (2007) states that “a self-administered questionnaire is a valuable tool 
in (social scientific) research. In organizational culture research, however, certain 
conditions apply which might make the self-administered questionnaire less useful” (p.725). 
These conditions contribute to the measurement error (the difference between what is true 
and what is measured) of the survey. The conditions identified by Guldenmund (2007) are:  
x in most of the safety climate literature, there are insufficient participants to average 
out random influences; 
x the scales used to record the responses (e.g., Likert scales) are assumed to be interval, 
when they are actually ordinal, rendering parametric multivariate statistical techniques 
invalid; 
x there is confusion in safety climate research in distinguishing between attitudes and 
perceptions; and 
x organizations are not a closed system, and there are outside conditions (e.g., national 
culture, socio-economic circumstances) that influence the workforce (particularly if 
an organisation has not had any serious mishaps). 
 
Both reliability and validity are affected by measurement error. Random error has an 
impact on reliability, while non-random measurement error directly affects validity. The first 
two conditions identified by Guldenmund (2007) contribute to random measurement error 
and can be addressed with a sufficiently  large number of responses. However, as will be 
shown, the presence of non-random measurement error in safety climate survey data also is a 






The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence, using the descriptive analysis of a 
large sample of safety climate questionnaire responses, for the presence of non-random 
measurement error in safety climate questionnaire data. The issues identified with the data 
reported in this paper are certainly not confined to safety climate questionnaires, and have 
been shown to be weaknesses with questionnaire methodology more generally (e.g., 
Krosnick, 1999; Marsden & Wright, 2010). Nevertheless, despite the almost exclusive focus 
on the use of a survey methodology for collecting safety-climate data, the limitations of this 
technique are rarely discussed within the context of the safety climate literature. Reasons why 
safety climate survey data are at particular high risk of non-random measurement error will 
be presented, and the implications for future research delineated. 
 
4. The Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) 
Just as has been the case in other high-risk industries, U.S. Naval aviation recognized 
that there was a need to develop a tool to assess safety climate, and provide feedback to a 
squadron’s (a military aviation unit with a total of 12 to 24 aircraft, depending on aircraft 
type) Commanding Officer (COs) on the state of the safety climate. To achieve this goal the 
Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) was developed by researchers at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (Desai et al., 2006). The 61-item CSAS is completed on-line, and 
responses are obtained for each item on a five point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree)1. A small number of additional questions elicit demographic and 
organizational data. The responses are anonymous. 
 The theoretical background underpinning the CSAS is based upon a conceptual 
framework of Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) that identified five major areas 
 
1 A list of the CSAS items is available in the appendix of Adamshick (2007). 
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relevant to organizations in managing risk and developing a climate to reduce mishaps in 
high reliability organizations (Libuser, 1994). The five MOSE areas are:  
x process auditing – a system of ongoing checks to monitor hazardous conditions; 
x reward system – expected social compensation or disciplinary action to reinforce or 
correct behavior; 
x quality assurance – policies and procedures that promote high quality performance; 
x risk management – how the organization perceives risk and takes corrective action; and 
x command and control – policies, procedures, and communication processes used to 
mitigate risk. 
 The Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) was used continuously by the U.S. 
Navy from 2000 until 2009 (the CSAS is still used in U.S. Naval aviation, but some changes 
were made to the content and structure of the questionnaire in early 2010). The specific 
results of a squadron’s CSAS are only available to the CO. However, aggregated data are 
made available to all COs for comparison of their squadron’s performance with that of their 
peers. The CSAS is typical of many of the safety climate questionnaires reported in the 
literature in terms of the length of the survey and the questions that are asked. However, there 
are two important differences in the administration of the CSAS that distinguish it from the 
typical method that is reported in the literature. 
Until 2004, completion of the CSAS was voluntary. However, in 2004 Vice Admiral 
Zortman declared the CSAS mandatory for all squadrons to complete semiannually and 
within 30 days following a change of command (a change of command is when a new CO 
takes over a squadron, and occurs approximately every two years; Zortman, 2004). Thus, in 
practice a particular aviator is likely to be required to complete the CSAS at least twice in any 
given two year period. For typical safety climate surveys participation is voluntary and the 
study is generally a ‘single shot’ assessment. 
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To date three published studies that have utilized CSAS data (Desai et al., 2006; 
Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli, 2003; Singer, Rosen, Zhao, Ciavarelli, & Gaba, 
2010). However the factor structure of the CSAS was not examined. We recognized the lack 
of a validated factor structure as a hindrance to the advancement of the instrument itself, and 
importantly, it’s potential to prevent mishaps. Given this fact, it was our original intention to 
conduct a confirmatory factor analysis in order to establish the construct validity of the 
CSAS. Once a stable factor structure was established, researchers could begin to evaluate the 
predictive validity of the instrument or model the factor structure for comparison within and 
across industries. However, during the initial data screening process (described in this paper), 
it quickly became evident that there were some serious threat to the validity of the data 
collected using the instrument. 
 
5. Dataset 
 Following approval by Commander Naval Air Forces, all of the responses to the 
CSAS from 2000 until 2009 were obtained. The data contains 110,014 responses to each of 
the 61 items in the CSAS. A total of 65% responses were obtained from Navy aircrew, and 
31% from Marine Corps aircrew, the remainder being identified as “other.” Of the 
respondents 67% were officers, and 33% were enlisted personnel (predominately aircrew). 
The officers primarily consisted of pilots and Naval Flight Officers (NFOs; officers who 
specialize in airborne weapons and sensor systems, but do not actually fly the aircraft). Only 
3% of aircrew were officers, but 94% of NFOs and 99% of pilots were officers.  
A total of 16% of respondents flew in TACAIR aircraft (Tactical Aviation, which 
includes multirole fighter aircraft such as the F/A-18 Hornet and E/A-8 Prowler), 32% in 
rotary wing aircraft (helicopters such as the SH-60 Seahawk), 31% in big wing aircraft (large 
transport and surveillance aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules and P-3 Orion), 13% in 
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training aircraft, and the remaining 5% did not provide information on the aircraft flown. The 
response rate from the entire population of U.S Naval aviators was 75.5%. 
 Given the frequency with which the questionnaire was completed, in the majority of 
cases the same respondent will have answered the survey on multiple occasions. However, as 
the responses are anonymous it was not possible to identify the repeated survey responses of 
an individual respondent. As a result of this fact, it was necessary to treat each set of 
responses to the CSAS as independent observations. Although not ideal, it is proposed that 
the assumption of independence is not a major limitation to the study for the following 
reasons. Firstly, there is constant turnover of personnel in a U.S Naval aviation squadron. 
Aviators will generally only spend two to three years in a particular squadron before they 
move on to a different squadron or other non-flying assignment. Therefore, even within the 
same squadron there is likely to be changes in the safety climate as personnel rotate in an out. 
Secondly, the CSAS generally is completed twice over two year span of time. Therefore, a 
respondent is unlikely to recall how he or she responded to the CSAS items the last time they 
completed the survey. 
 
6. Evidence of substantial non-random measurement error 
Below we provide five different pieces of evidence that support our claim of 
substantial non-random measurement error in the responses to the CSAS.  
 
6.1 Reversed items displayed a unique response pattern  
Five items from the CSAS had negatively worded items. In contrast to the majority of 
the CSAS items, a Likert rating of 1 “strongly disagree” to a negatively worded item is 
indicative of a desirable response. These items were: 
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x Item 18 — I am not comfortable reporting a safety violation, because people in my 
command would react negatively toward me; 
x Item 23 — Command leaders permit cutting corners to get a job done; 
x Item 24 — Lack of experienced personnel has adversely affected my command's 
ability to operate safely; 
x Item 30 — My command has increased the chances of a mishap due to inadequate or 
incorrect risk assessment; and  
x Item 34 — Based upon my command's personnel and other assets, the command is 
over-committed.  
As part of the data screening process, the responses to these five items questions were 
reversed so that Likert ratings of ‘1’ were recorded as ‘5’ and so on by subtracting the 
response from six. Despite the reversal of the answers for these questions there is some 
evidence that respondents were confused when it came to answering them. Overall, across all 
questions, about 4.5% of items were rated a ‘1’ or ‘2’ but 16% of the reversed questions were 
given a rating of ‘1’ or ‘2’. Put another way, although reversed questions accounted for only 
8.8% of total responses, they accounted for 33.9% of all ‘1’ ratings. (Recall that a ‘1’ in this 
analysis corresponds to an original answer of ‘5’ by the respondent.) The proportion of ‘1’ 
and ‘2’ Likert ratings can be seen in Figure 1. Note that for all five reversed questions, more 
than 7.5% of ratings to each of these items is a ‘1’ or a ‘2’ (the horizontal line indicates 
7.5%). Out of the other 52 items, only four were rated ‘1’or ’2’ more that 7.5% of the time. 
These items were:  
x Item 31 — I am provided adequate resources, time, staffing, budget, and 
equipment, to accomplish my job;  
x Item 32 — My command provides the right number of flight hours per month for 
me to fly safely; 
x Item 50 — Morale and motivation in my command are high; and  
x Item 55 — Within my command, good communications flow exists up and down 
the chain of command. 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of "1" or "2" Likert responses by item (triangles indicate the negatively 





























































It is difficult to discern whether the large number of “1” and “2” Likert ratings to 
items 31, 32, 50, and 55 is paralleled in the large number of those responses in the reversed 
questions. Our judgment is that the former set of “1” and “2” Likert ratings probably reflect 
real dissatisfaction and that the latter is most likely due, at least in part, to confusion on the 






6.2 Little item-to-item variability in responses 
As discussed in section five, although we had to treat each set of responses to the 61 
CSAS items as independent, we were able to examine the pattern of responses to the items on 
each occasion the questionnaire was completed. It was found that there was very little 
variability in the range of responses provided to the items. Out of the 110,014 times the 
questionnaire was completed, for 8.0% the very same Likert rating was given to all items 
(this percentage is based upon 52 items- it does not include the nine items identified in 
section 6.1). Additionally, for 24.9% of the times the questionnaire was completed, only two 
possible Likert ratings were provided across the set of 52 items. On only 31% of occasions 
were four or all five possible Likert ratings used. Indeed on many of the occasions the 
questionnaire was completed, almost all items were answered with the same Likert rating. 
For example, on more than half of the occasions the questionnaire was completed, the same 
Likert rating was provided to at least 40 items.  
Little variability in the responses to large numbers of questionnaire items is a threat to 
both construct and discriminate validity (see O’Connor, O’Dea, Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011 
for a detailed discussion of these concepts within the context of safety climate surveys). 
Construct validity is the extent to which the questionnaire measures what it is intended to 
measure. Identification of a reliable factor structure, that is consistent with theory, helps the 
researcher substantiate claims regarding the construct validity of the questionnaire. 
Establishing a reliable factor structure is generally carried out using exploratory and/or 
confirmatory factor analysis techniques. However, a large number of items with little 
variability leads to a lack of normality among the data and invalidates exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis methods. Another issue is that low variability tends to result in 
principle components analysis (often used to carry out exploratory factor analysis in the 
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literature; O’Connor et al., 2011) identifying only one principle component including all of 
the items. 
Discriminate validity is the ability of the questionnaire to differentiate between 
organizations or personnel with different levels of safety performance. If a large proportion of 
respondents agree (or disagree) with a particular item, then the item is not useful in 
distinguishing between high- and low- safety performing groups. The danger of retaining a 
large number of nondiscriminating items when exploring differences between different 
groups of respondents is that the discriminating items can become “washed out” when they 
are averaged with nondiscriminating items. 
 
6.3 Changes in response pattern across time 
As described above, participation in the survey was voluntarily until October 2004, 
after which time it became mandatory. The mode of the Likert ratings to the 52 items retained 
for analysis was calculated for each individual occasion that the questionnaire was 
completed. If a Likert rating to a specific item was made at that mode, this will be described 
as the ‘modal response.’ To illustrate, if the mode of the Likert rating on a particular occasion 
that the questionnaire was completed was ‘4’, with the participant using a rating of ‘4’ for 40 
items, then the modal response was given 40 times out of 52. Similarly, if on another 
occasion the questionnaire was completed the mode of the Likert rating was ‘5’ with a rating 
of ‘5’ given for 35 items, then the modal response was given 35 times. It was found there was 
an increase in the frequency of modal responses for those questionnaires that were completed 
post-October 2004 as compared to pre-October 2004. 
In fact, there are two changes that appear to take place in the response patterns to the 
questionnaire items as years go by, not just as the boundary between voluntary and 
mandatory reporting is crossed. First, there was an increase over the years in the frequency of 
questionnaires for which the mode of the ratings was ‘5’, and also of the frequency of 
questionnaires for which the mode of the ratings was ‘3’ or less. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of questionnaires for which the mode of the ratings was other than ‘4’; the sum of 
these went from a low of 29.5% in 2002 to a high of 39.8% in 2007. The effect of this change 
is to decrease the variance in the ratings, leading to a lack of homogeneity of variance. The 
effect of this non-constant variance is to render invalid the standard statistical tests that rely 
on it being constant (e.g. factor analysis, analysis of variance).  
 
Figure 2. Percentage of questionnaires for which the modal response was less than or equal to 
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, there was also a different kind of change in 
the variance over time that acted to decrease it. Figure 3 (left) shows the average number of 
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different Likert ratings to the items on each occasion the questionnaire was completed, by 
year. The downward trend indicates that increasingly over the years only a few of the 
possible range of Likert ratings were being used. The right panel shows the average number 
of modal ratings each time the questionnaire was completed, by year. In 2009 a modal rating 
was given to more than 40 of the 54 questions, up from around 36 in 2000. Therefore, 
although these two shifts have opposing effects on the variance, the overall outcome is a lack 
of homogeneity of variance of the data.  
 
Figure 3. Decrease in number of non-modal responses (left) and increase in the mean number 
































































































6.4 Lower than desirable correlation between responses to identical items.  
Items 5 and 43 are exactly the same (they both read “command leadership is actively 
involved in the safety program and management of safety matters”). In the data collected 
prior to 2008, the correlation between the sets of responses for these two items was found to 
be 0.69, high in comparison to many other pairwise correlations (it is in the 97th percentile of 
the set of 1,326 pairwise correlations) but still, not the largest among the 1,326 pairs.  
 
6.5 Relationship between time to complete and number of modal responses.  
From 2006 onwards data were collected on the length of time taken to complete the 
CSAS. Table 1 shows the proportion of modal responses, broken down by whether the time 
to complete was less than ten minutes, unrecorded, or greater than ten minutes. Ten minutes 
was selected as the cut-off through a detailed analysis of the proportion of modal responses 
across 60 second intervals.  
 
Table 1. Proportion of modal responses for each occasion the CSAS completed, by time 
taken to complete. 
Time to complete survey # of responses 
at mode d 10 mins. >10 mins. Not timed 
13-29 12.1 20.3 17.7 
30-39 24.2 33.3 32.6 
40-44 15.1 18.2 17.7 
45+ 48.6 28.3 31.9 
Sample size 24154 23442 62418 
 
 
Table 1 highlights substantial differences in response patterns when the survey was 
completed quickly as compared to when more time was taken to complete the survey. The 
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last column (the untimed data prior to 2006) appears, not surprisingly, to be a blend of the 
two types of responses. 
 
7. Summary of descriptive analysis  
This descriptive data analysis indicates non-random measurement error associated 
with the CSAS response set. The reverse worded items had a unique pattern of responses, 
there was a increasing tendency over the years to only provide modal responses to the items, 
the responses to the same item towards the beginning and end of the questionnaire did not 
correlate as highly as might be expected, and the faster the questionnaire was completed, the 
higher the frequency of modal responses.  
An individual who is motivated to participate in a survey will be more likely to 
provide a response that is an accurate reflection of their true attitude. However, if a 
respondent lacks the motivation to participate then he or she is more likely to adopt a 
satisficing response strategy to select a reasonable answer. Satisficing is a strategy in which 
the respondent interprets each question superficially and selects what he or she believes to be 
a reasonable answer. The answer “is selected without referring to any internal psychological 
cues relevant to the attitude, belief, or event of interest. Instead, the respondent may look to 
the wording of the question for a cue, pointing to a response that can be easily selected and 
defended if necessary. If no such cue is present, the respondent may arbitrarily select an 
answer” (Krosnick, 1999: 548).  
Motivation to participate will be higher if the questionnaire is constructed in such a 
way that it appears to be quick and easy to complete (Dillman, 1978). Motivation is also 
affected by the degree to which the topic of a question is personally important to the 
respondent, beliefs about whether the survey will have useful consequences, respondent 
fatigue, and aspects of questionnaire administration that encourage, or discourage 
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participation (Krosnick & Presser, 2010). Each of these influences will be discussed 
specifically within the context of safety climate surveys. 
 
8. Questionnaire design 
When designing safety climate questionnaires, researchers must consider the effect on 
respondent motivation of item complexity, the number of items in the questionnaire, and the 
use of reverse worded items. These factors are discussed in detail below. 
 
8.1 Item complexity.  
In comparison to, for example, personality or health questionnaires with items such as 
‘I often feel blue’ or ‘to what degree do you experience pressure due to your job?’ the items 
that are typically included in safety climate surveys are very complex and open to different 
interpretations by respondents. To illustrate, consider the CSAS item, ‘within my command, 
good communications flow exists up and down the chain of command.’ It may be that 
communications are good down the chain of command, but not up. It is also possible that 
communications about some issues is good, but it is not the case for others. The item may be 
better written as “within my command there is good communication about safety”, and/or 
separating the item to distinguish between communication ‘up’, and communication ‘down’ 
the chain of command. 
Another example of a typical safety climate questionnaire item is, ‘my management 
care about the negative effect that job uncertainty has on safety’ (taken from the offshore 
safety questionnaire; Mearns, Whitaker, Flin, Gordon, & O’Connor, 2003). It may be that 
some managers do, and others do not. The term ‘management’ is also very ambiguous in the 
context of the offshore industry as the majority of the workforce are contractors and so 
management could refer to either the contract company managers or the operating company 
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mangers. The item would be less ambiguous if it referred to a specific management role such 
as the Oil Instillation Manager (the most senior manager on an oil platform).  
These two exemplar items are typical of those included in safety climate surveys. If a 
respondent is not motivated, does not understand the question, or does not feel he or she can 
answer the question then it is unlikely that the required cognitive effort will be used or the 
person simply may be unable to provide an accurate and thoughtful response. Therefore, 
researchers should make efforts to ensure that the items in the questionnaire are simple, and 
readily understood by participants. 
 
8.2 Number of items.  
As would be expected, as the number of items in a questionnaire increases, there is a 
corresponding reduction in the number of people willing to complete it (Sheehan, 2001; 
Smith, Olah, Hansen, & Cumbo, 2003). However, safety climate surveys, the CSAS 
included, generally consist of a large numbers of items. The Veteran Health Administration 
survey has 112 items (Singer et al., 2003). In the 18 safety climate questionnaires reviewed 
by Flin et al., 2000, the mean number of items was 60.8, (st dev=28.8). Studies have reported 
more missing data, higher levels of agreement, and less differentiation among items when 
they appear later in a questionnaire as compared to when the same items are placed earlier in 
the questionnaire (e.g., Johnson, Sieveking, & Clanton, 1974). Therefore, researchers should 
give careful consideration to the number of items in safety climate questionnaires, and make 
efforts to keep the questionnaire as short as possible. 
 
8.3 Reverse worded items. 
 The responses to the reverse worded items in the CSAS demonstrated a unique 
response pattern. There is a large literature on issues with internal consistency, factor 
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structures, and other statistics when negatively worded items are used in combination with 
positively worded items (e.g., Barnette, 2000; Herche & Engelland, 1996). Nevertheless, 
despite the recognition that negatively worded items can introduce measurement error, they 
are used in many safety climate questionnaires (e.g., Antonsen, 2009; Mearns et al., 2003; 
Gibbons et al., 2006) and little mention is made of the potential problems with negatively 
worded items beyond the fact that the responses were reversed for analysis. Therefore, 
careful consideration should be given to the inclusions of reverse worded items in safety 
climate surveys, and these items should be screened to ensure they do not have a unique 
response pattern. 
 
9. Belief in the importance and usefulness of the questionnaire 
If a survey participant believes his or her response is important, has an interest in the 
topic area, and believes that the response will have consequences, then the participant will be 
more likely to expend the effort required to provide a thoughtful response. Squadron COs are 
not required to share the CSAS findings with squadron members, and information is not 
available about the prevalence with which COs share the survey results. However, if similar 
organizational surveys have been carried out in the past with no feedback to participants, and 
no evidence of changes resulting from the survey, then it stands to reason that participants 
will be less likely to exert effort in completing the survey. To illustrate, Ward (1994) found 
that General Practitioners are less likely to participate in future surveys if they are given 
insufficient feedback from previous participation. Although this is not likely to be within the 
control of the researcher, senior leadership must demonstrate support for the survey. Support 
could be demonstrated by providing time during the work day to complete the questionnaire, 
explaining the purpose of the survey, and providing assurances the information is important 
and the findings will be acted upon.  
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Another issue that is likely to have a negative impact on beliefs about the importance 
and usefulness of survey response is whether the participants themselves believe they have 
attitudes towards safety climate worthy of reporting. As can be seen from Figures 2, the vast 
majority of respondents either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with most of the CSAS items. If the 
respondents are generally satisfied with the state of the safety climate in the squadron (as 
measured by the survey), then they may not feel that it is necessary to carefully consider each 
and every survey item before responding. 
 
10. Respondent fatigue 
As discussed earlier, questionnaire length and complexity are likely to have a negative 
effect on respondent motivation, and will also contribute to respondent fatigue. U.S. Naval 
aviators complete a large number of mandatory surveys (e.g., equal opportunities, command 
climate). Moreover, the CSAS is one of an increasing number of behavior-based safety 
programs that have been introduced in naval aviation in the last decade. O’Connor and O’Dea 
(2008) identified 15 individual elements of the naval aviation safety program that focus on 
addressing the human causes of mishaps. Therefore, it is possible that there may be a larger 
overall climate of “safety fatigue” and “survey fatigue” within naval aviation. These types of 
fatigue are not specific to U.S Naval aviation, and are likely to be prevalent in other 
organizations in which safety climate surveys are utilized. Therefore, researchers must 
attempt to avoid periods of particularly high workload, or immediately following another 
survey when distributing safety climate surveys. 
 
11. Questionnaire administration. 
11.1 Mandatory completion. 
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As described in the introduction, since 2004, naval aviators are mandated to complete 
the questionnaire. The analysis showed that there was an increase in the number of modal 
responses after completion was made mandatory as compared to when participation was 
voluntary. As the respondents who do not wish to participate cannot opt out, a large 
proportion of aircrew may use a strategy of questionnaire completion that requires as little 
cognitive effort as possible (i.e. adopt a satisficing strategy), but still allows them to “do their 
duty”. This argument is supported by the finding that on 50% of the survey occasions, the 
CSAS was completed in less than 10 minutes.  
The risk is that those respondents who have strong opinions about the state of the 
safety climate are being ‘washed out’ by the high numbers adopting a satisficing strategy. So, 
although a large proportion of naval aviators completed the CSAS, the quality of the data 
were compromised. Therefore, of greater importance than having a large proportion of a 
population completing the questionnaire is the extent to which the responses obtained are a 
true representation of that population’s attitudes and beliefs. It would seem that researchers 
should examine the selection bias of volunteers as copmpared to respondents who are 
‘compelled’ to participate in survey research.. 
 
11.2 Survey frequency 
Apart from U.S. Naval aviation, there are few examples of the use of the same safety 
climate survey on more than one occasion within the same organizations (Mearns et al., 2003 
being a notable exception). Pronovost and Sexton (2005) recommend annual safety climate 
surveys of hospital staff, and we believe that the use of safety climate questionnaires on 
multiple occasions within the same organization is likely to become more commonplace. 
From both an operational and research perspective, measuring the safety climate of an 
organization on more than one occasion is desirable. Multiple measurements allows an 
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assessment to be made of how safety climate is changing over time and provides data that 
allows for the evaluation of the effectiveness of programs designed to impact safety climate. 
It is surprising that there is almost no research on the impact of multiple survey 
requests on survey response reported in the literature (Porter, Whitcomb, & Weitzer, 2004). 
However, as shown in Figure 3, the increase in the number of modal responses over time 
suggests that quality of information is being sacrificed for quantity. Therefore, researchers 
should give careful consideration on the frequency with which safety climate surveys are 
administered in order to reduce the likelihood of survey-taking fatigue.  
 
12. Implications of the findings for future safety climate research 
 We believe safety-climate data collected using a complex and lengthy survey leads 
to substantial non-random measurement error. Although the requirement for mandatory 
completion is unique to the CSAS, the other risk factors discussed above are common across 
the majority of safety climate surveys reported in the literature. We are not suggesting the 
abandonment of surveys as a method for assessing safety climate, but researchers must make 
efforts to limit non-random measurement error in the data through survey design, survey 
administration, and motivating respondents. In agreement with Antonsen (2009), a 
triangulation of quantitative and qualitative is recommended for assessing the safety climate 
of an organization. Recently, qualitative assessments of safety climate have begun to be 
reported in the literature (e.g., Atak & Kingma, 2011; Haukelid, 2008; Richter & Koch, 
2004). Other researchers also agree that a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques provides a comprehensive evaluation of the safety climate of an organization (e.g., 
Antonsen, 2009; Gibbons et al., 2006).  
 In the U.S Navy, squadron COs are able to obtain a qualitative assessment of the 
safety climate of his/her squadron by requesting a safety culture workshop. The purpose of 
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the safety culture workshop identifies potential hazards that might interfere with mission 
accomplishment. They also identify command strengths. A safety culture workshop is 
facilitated by specially trained senior naval aviators. The facilitators spend time looking 
around the squadron, watching people working, and having informal conversations with a 
cross section of squadron personnel. Following the informal phase of the workshop, the 
facilitators carry out focus group discussions with squadron personnel. The information 
gleaned from the workshop is then summarized and given back to the squadron’s CO. The 
CO should use this information to focus on areas that require better risk assessment and risk 
controls. Currently, safety culture workshops are not mandatory, and are run independently 
from the CSAS. It is suggested that these two programs should be integrated to allow a more 
complete picture of the safety climate of the squadron to be obtained.  
 
13. Conclusion 
The descriptive analysis of the CSAS data reported in this paper has demonstrated the 
presence of non-random measurement error in safety climate survey data. We readily 
acknowledge that the issues identified in this paper are not new, nor unique to safety climate 
questionnaires. However, although the threat of non-random measurement error would seem 
to be particularly high with safety climate surveys, it is largely ignored in the safety climate 
literature.  
We believe that the evidence presented here supports the conclusion that the use of 
long and complex surveys should cease to be the measurement method for assessing safety 
climate. It is recommended that a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods should 
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